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NOTES
would be entitled to "unlimited" section 706 review. If the court
should find in the underlying statute a congressional intent to pre-
clude review under section 701(a)(1), a result which is becoming in-
creasingly rare, the plaintiff would be reduced to arguing the uncon-
stitutionality of such an enactment. If section 701(a)(2) of the APA
applies, the plaintiff should argue that the result is not automatic
nonreviewability. The plaintiff should point out that under the cur-
rent interpretation of section 701(a)(2), the court may separate the
discretionary action into reviewable and nonreviewable elements. Al-
ternatively, the plaintiff could argue that section 701(a)(2)'s immediate
effect is only to remove the action from the APA and that once out-
side the APA, the action is still reviewable under common law. While
Bachowski might hinder such a claim, its treatment of the scope of re-
view issue tends to support the existence of common law review. If
the court adopts either the extent or common law approach to section
701(a)(2), the plaintiff should urge the court to adopt a scope of re-
view that includes the abuse of discretion standard. Bachowski supports
such a claim because it allows the court to review even highly dis-
cretionary actions for an abuse of discretion, provided the evidentiary
base is limited to something less than the whole administrative record.
DENNIS LAFIURA
Copyright — Validity of Copyright Renewal — Evidentiary Effect of
Renewal Certificate — Epoch Producing Corp. v. Kitliam Shows,
Inc.' — David W. Griffith produced and directed the motion picture
classic The Birth of a Nation in 1914. 2 The David W. Griffith Corpora-
tion [hereinafter DWG], a corporation personally controlled by Grif-
fith, copyrighted The Birth as an unpublished work in 1915, and in the
same year acquired a copyright in the published work by exhibiting
the film with notice of copyright. 3 Two months later DWG assigned
both copyrights to Epoch Producing Corporation [hereinafter Epoch]
and Thomas Dixon, author of the novel on which The Birth was
1 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 740.
3 Id, Statutory copyright in an unpublished work is acquired by depositing a copy
and registering the work with the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). Statutory
copyright in the published work is acquired by publication of the work with notice of
copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S.
30, 35-42 (1939). Although copyright in the published work is thus acquired without
registration with the Copyright Office, the proprietor is not entitled to bring an in-
fringement action unless the copyright in the work has been so registered. 17 U.S.C.
13 (1970). See 522 F.2d at 740-41 n.2, When copyright in the published work has
been registered, the Copyright Office issues a certificate of registration. 17 U.S.C. § 11
(1970). The contents of the certificate of registration are designated in 17 U.S.C. * 209
(1970).
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based. 4
 Epoch and Dixon thereafter obtained a certificate of copyright
registration in the published work from the Copyright Office. 5
 In
1942, Epoch applied for renewal of its copyright, describing itself as
the original claimant, the author, 9
 and the proprietor of copyright in
a work made for hire.' The Copyright Office issued a renewal certifi-
cate to Epoch on the basis of its third asserted status: the proprietor
of copyright in a work made for hire. 9
In 1959, Killiam Shows, Inc. acquired by quitclaim deed any in-
terest owned by the estate of David W. Griffith in the right to a
statutory renewal copyright in The Birth. Killiam Shows thereafter dis-
tributed the film to various theatrical and television outlets. 9
 Asserting
its renewal copyright, Epoch brought suit in federal district court
against Killiam Shows and related corporations in 1969 for infringe-
ment of its copyright in The Birth." Killiam answered, inter alia, that
Epoch's renewal copyright was invalid because Epoch had no legal
right to the renewal." Thus, Killiam contended, The Birth had passed
into the public domain upon the termination of the original copyright
term in 1943."
The question of Epoch's status as a corporation entitled to the
renewal copyright was submitted to a jury after Killiam's motion for a
4
 522 F.2d at 741.
5 Id. DWG did not register the copyright it had acquired by publishing the film
with notice. Id. at 740-41. When Epoch and Dixon applied for registration of copyright,
the Copyright Office issued Epoch and Dixon certificates that listed them as the regis-
tered claimants of the original-term copyright. Id. at 741. The copyrights were assigned
in 1915 but the assignment of copyright in the published work was not filed with the
Copyright Office until 1916, after the registration certificate had been issued to Epoch
and Dixon. Early Copyright Office practice permitted the assignee of an unregistered
statutory copyright to supply his own name as claimant of the original-term copyright.
B. KAPLAN, THE REGISTRATION or COPYRIGHT 32 (General Revision of the Copyright
Law, Study No. 17, 1958), in COPYRIGHT SOCY. OF THE U.S.A., 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT
358 (1963).
I' Id. at 741. By naming itself as "author" in the application for renewal of
copyright, Epoch was asserting that it had been Griffith's employer when the film was
made. Id, Section 26 of the Copyright Act provides that in the interpretation of the Act,
"the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire." In
this note, the term "individual author" will be used to designate a creative author, as
distinguished from an employer.
522 F.2d at 741. In contrast to its claim to renewal as "author," Epoch's claim as
proprietor of copyright in a work made for hire was not in itself an assertion that
Epoch had been Griffith's employer. For instance, an employer's assignee is a pro-
prietor of copyright in a work made for hire. I M. NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 61,3 at 237; 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 114 at 463 (1975).
522 F.2d at 741.
Id. at 742.
"Id. at 739. The district court opinion is unreported.
" Id. Killiam also contended that its purchase from Griffith's estate by quitclaim
deed in 1959 of the estate's copyright interest in The Birth had given Killiam a property
interest in the copyright. Killiam did not present this argument on appeal. Id. at 742
"Id. at 739. A copyrighted work passes into the public domain if the copyright is
not renewed within the year prior to its expiration. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) set out in
note 26 infra.
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directed verdict was denied." The district court specifically instructed
the jury that Epoch's renewal certificate created a presumption that
the renewal copyright was valid." The jury found that Killiam had
failed to overcome that presumption and it held Killiam liable for
infringement.'
On appeal, Killiam argued that Epoch had had no legal right in
1942 to renew the copyright because Epoch's status was not one which
entitled it to renew as a matter of right under the Copyright Act."
Killiam also asserted that the certificate of copyright renewal granted
to Epoch did not create a presumption of validity, and that absent this
presumption Epoch had the burden of establishing that it was legally
entitled to the copyright renewal, a: burden which it had failed to
meet." Finally, Killiam argued that because Epoch was not within the
specified classes of original-term copyright proprietors who are legally
entitled to renew in their own right, the renewal rights had reverted
to the individual author since they were never specifically assigned by
him in conjunction with his assignment of the original-term
copyright.' 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, re-
versing the denial of Killiam's motion for a directed verdict, HELD:
Under section 24 of the Copyright Act, (1) the proprietor of a
copyright in a work made for hire is entitled to renewal only upon a
showing of the alleged employer's :"requisite power to control or
supervise" the work of the author;" (2) the right to renew a copyright
reverts to the individual author if it 'was not specifically assigned by
him when he assigned his original copyright;" (3) the issuance of a
renewal certificate does not create a presumption that the underlying
15 Id. at 740.
" The trial court's charge to the jury included the following statement:
A Certificate Of Renewal of copyright registration carries with it the same
presumptions as to the facts stated therein, the truth of them and the va-
lidity of the renewal and the administrative regularity comprised within its
issuance, and here again the passage of time may tend to strengthen the
force of these presumptions, but all presumptions I may mention to you
may be rebutted by you, if you, the jury, find there is adequate evidence
to convince you the presumptions are inapplicable, and you must decide
the case on the evidence and not the presumptions, but the burden is on a
party who attacks or challenges the validity of a certificate of copyright or
of a certificate of copyright renewal to overcome the presumption that the
facts are as stated in the certificate and to overcome the presumption of
validity of the certificate.
Brief for Appellee at 25, Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
15 522 F.2d at 740.
'" Id. at 739. See 17 U.S.C.. § 24 (1970).
" Brief for Appellants of 46-50, Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc.,
522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
"id. at 27-46.
" 522 F.2d at 744.
50 1d. at 746-47.
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copyright renewal is valid; 2 ' and (4) the proprietor of a copyright in a
work copyrighted by a corporate body is not entitled to renewal if the
work was created by one identifiable person as either an employee or
an independent author. 22 The court then concluded that Epoch had
failed to meet its burden of establishing the validity of its renewal
copyright and remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to dismiss Epoch's complaint. 23
The significance of Epoch lies primarily in the court's holding
that a renewal certificate does not create a presumption of the validity
of a copyright renewal. That ruling is the first appellate-level judicial
determination which directly confronts the issue of the evidentiary
weight of a renewal certificate." The court's holding that the
corporate-body provision does not apply to works authored and pro-
duced by one identifiable person, as either an employee or an inde-
pendent author, is also significant in that the court's language severely
limits the type of works to which the provision applies. However, the
court's rulings with respect to the prerequisites to finding an
employer-employee relationship under the work-for-hire provision
and with respect to the specificity with which an individual author's
renewal rights must be assigned were based upon earlier decisions
and add little to the corpus of the law of copyright.
This casenote will first briefly examine the court's rulings on the
issues of the work-for-hire provision of section 24 and the assignment
of renewal rights by an individual author. Next, the court's holding
on the corporate-body provision will be analyzed and it will be sug-
gested that through its refusal to adopt an expansive reading of the
terms of this provision, the court has adhered to established public
policy and the implications of the legislative history of the provision.
Finally, the note will analyze the rationale used by the court to sup-
port its holding on the evidentiary weight of renewal certificates; con-
sider that holding in light of the policies of the Copyright Act and the
public policy against the extension of what is already a statutory
monopoly; attempt to show that the court's holding is consistent with
and advances those policies; and attempt to discern the effect of this
holding on future infringement litigation.
I. SECTION 24 OF THE COPYRIGHT Ac-r OF 1909
Under the general scheme of section 24 of the Copyright Act,
21 Id. at 745-46.
22 /4. at 748.
" id. at 748-49.
" In at least three previous cases in the Second Circuit, the court was called
upon to determine renewal rights where both parties had obtained renewal certificates.
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
997 (1972); M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 950 (2d Cir.
1942); Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd
sub nom. Gumm v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946). The Court did
not refer to the evidentiary weight of renewal certificates in deciding these cases.
610
NOTES
which was intended primarily to protect authors,25 renewal rights re-
vert to the author who created the work or, if he is deceased, to his
family, executor, or next of kin, subject to certain exceptions. A pro-
prietor of the original copyright who is not the author of the work
may renew the copyright only if his copyright is on a work which falls
within one of three specified categories: (1) works made for hire and
originally copyrighted by the employer for whom the work was made;
(2) works copyrighted by a corporate body in some capacity other
than as the individual author's assignee or'licensee; or (3).posthumous
works or periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite works originally
copyrighted by the proprietor. If the copyright is not renewed by the
author or one of the proprietors specified in section 24 within the
year prior to the copyright's expiration, the work passes into the pub-
lic domain. 28 Epoch contended that its renewal was valid under both
the work-for-hire and the corporate-body provisions.
Epoch first argued that it was entitled to renew under the work-
for-hire provision because Griffith had made the film as an employee
and Epoch's registration of its assignments in 1915 had been the se-
curing of copyright by an employer." Epoch's rather convoluted ar-
" See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 653-54 (1954).
The purpose of the renewal provisions of the copyright statutes since 1831 has been "to
give the reward to the author rather than the bookseller." Miller Music Corp. v. Charles
N. Daniels, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd., 265 F.2d 925 (1959),
affd., 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
16 Section 24 provides:
The copyright secured by this title shall endure for twenty-eight
years from the date of first publication .... Provided, That in the case of
any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite
work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor
thereof, or of any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than
as assignee or licensee of the individual author) or by an employer for
whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall
be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for
the further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal
and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly regis-
tered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term
of copyright: And provided further, That in the case of any other copyright-
ed work, including a contribution by an individual author to a periodical
or to a cyclopedic or other composite work, the author of such work, if
still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author
be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living,
then the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work
for a further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal
and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly regis-
tered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term
of copyright: Arid provided further, Thae in dethult of the registration of
such application for renewal and extension, the copyright in any work
shall determine at the expiration or twenty-eight years from first publica-
tion.
17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
" 522 F.2d at 743-45.
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gument pointed to its assignments from Majestic Corporation" and
DWG, both of whom it characterized as employers," and then as-
serted that Epoch had obtained the original copyright in 1915 as an
employer because it stood in the shoes of Majestic and DWG by virtue
of the assignments. 3° Thus, because the copyright had been secured
by an employer as required by section 24, Epoch was entitled to
renew as the proprietor of copyright in a work made for hire."
Epoch's argument thus presupposed an employer-employee relation-
ship between the assignor corporations and Griffith.
Epoch's argument was rejected by the-court, since Epoch had
failed to prove that Griffith was the employee of either of the assign-
or corporations or of Epoch itself." The court first concluded that
Epoch could not be considered an employer of Griffith on the basis of
the assignments from the corporations since these corporations were
not shown to have exercised control and supervision over Griffith's
work. 33
 Epoch itself could not have been Griffith's employer because
it did not incorporate until after The Birth was completed. 34
The fact that Griffith had not created The Birth as an employee
also defeated Epoch's contention that it had received the renewal
rights by assignment from DWG. Since Griffith had created the work
as an independent author, DWG was not an employer and thus had
no independent right to the original copyright. Therefore, when
DWG obtained statutory copyright by publishing The Birth with notice
of copyright in DWG's name, it could only have done so as the assign-
ee of Griffith's common law copyright." Since there was no proof
that Griffith intended to assign the renewal term to DWG as well, a
finding that DWG received such an interest was precluded as a matter
of law."
The policy of the Copyright Act is to protect individual authors
by preventing inadvertent transfers of renewal rights. 37 Pursuant to
this policy, the Epoch court relied upon the well-settled principle that
an individual author's assignment of common law copyright conveys
only initial-term copyright;" the renewal term is a new grant" and is
28 Id. at 744; Brief for Appellee, supra n.14, at 27-30.
28 Brief for Appellee, supra n.14, at 29.
3° Id. at 28.
3 ' Id. at 27-29.
32 522 F.2d at 744-45.
33 1d. at 744, citing Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216-17,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
34 522 F.2d at 745.
33 id. at 747 & n.8.
38
 Id. at 747.
" Id., citing Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Charles K. Harris Music Publishing
Co., 255 F.2d 518, 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831 (1958).
" Griffith himself had not obtained statutory copyright, because he had neither
registered the film as an unpublished work nor published the work with notice of
copyright. 522 F,2d at 747 n.8, citing Austin v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 776 (N.D.
1962).
"See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.
1951).
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not conveyed by a general assignment unless there is proof of a con-
trary intention. 40
 Thus, DWG Corporation had not owned any in-
terest in the renewal term which it could have assigned to Epoch.
Epoch attempted to avoid the application of this principle by
noting that the assignment was from DWG, a corporation, and not
from the individual author, The protection afforded individual au-
thors should not be applicable, Epoch argued, to assignments by
corporations. 4 ' The court similarly rejected this argument, reasoning
that since DWG had been Griffith's "alter ego," its assignment to
Epoch was equivalent to an assignment from the individual author
himself. 42
Epoch also asserted that its renewal was valid under the
corporate-body provision of section 24. This provision grants the right
to renew to the proprietor of the original copyright "in the case ... of
any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee
or licensee of the individual author)."43
 Although the provision ap-
pears to grant corporations a special status by allowing them to renew
unless they are the author's assignee or licensee," its rather obscure
origins indicate that it was intended to limit the rights of corporations
by preserving renewal rights for authors who assigned their work to
corporate publishers. 45 It should be noted that such a limitation would
appear to be unnecessary, since renewal rights would revert to an
author-assignor under section 24 without the provision.
The provision is one of limited applicability." Clearly, if' an indi-
vidual author simply assigns his right to obtain copyright to a corpo-
rate body, the exclusion of corporate assignees from this renewal pro-
vision operates to reserve the right to renew to the author.'" If, on
the other hand, the corporation secures original copyright as the em-
ployer of the individual author, the corporation's right to renew is
expressly provided under the more specific work-for-hire provision."
4" 522 F.2d at 797.
Id. See Rohatier v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1962), where the court
found the policy of protecting the inierests of individual authors by preventing inadver-
tent transfers inapplicable Where none or the parties litigating the assignment of re-
newal rights was within the class given special statutory protection. Id. at 935-36.
as 522 F.2d at 747.
" 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
4.1 Neither initial-term nor renewal copyright may be obtained by a licensee. 2 M.
NIMMER, NtmmEu oN COPyRIGHT § 114.3 at 469 n.55 (1975).
45 See B. RINGER, RENEWAL or CoEvmmiT, (General Revision of the Copyright
Law, Preliminary Study No. 24, 1960).
4" judge Hand's description of the clause as "not entirely plain," Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1941), would seem to be based on ju-
dicial self-restraint. Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights, has stated that the provi-
sion "appears to be a dead letter" and is "practically meaningless." B. RINGER, RENEWAL.
Or COPYRIGHT, 107, 137 (General Revision of the Copyright Law Study No. 31, 1960),
in Coi ,vxu:i SOC'Y or U.S.A., 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 533 (1963); B. RINGER & P.
GITLIN, COPYRIGHTS 59 n.42 (1965).
47 Austin v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 776, 778 (N.D. 111. 1962). See text at notes
36-39 supra.
48 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 114.3 at 468 (1975).
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Moreover, the provision has been held not to grant renewal rights
where a corporation obtained original copyright on a work authored
by a dominant member of the corporatiop. 49 Since the provision does
not authorize renewal by a corporate assignee of the individual au-
thor, a corporate employer, or a corporate proprietor of copyright on
works created by a dominant member of the corporation, only a nar-
row category of author-corporation relationships remains as a basis
for renewal under the provision.
Judge Learned Hand, in Shapiro, Bernstein & co. v. Bryan, 5° in-
terpreted the provision by way of dicta as applying only to works pro-
duced by the fusion of common, indistinguishable contributions by
the members of a corporation." This interpretation is buttressed
somewhat by statements of the Register of Copyrights, soon after the
renewal provision came into effect, that the legislative history of the
clause suggests that it was meant to apply only to impersonal works
like digests and dictionaries. 52
In contrast to these narrow interpretations of the provision is the
potentially expansive reading suggested by Professor Nimmer, a lead-
ing authority in the field of copyright law. Professor Nimmer sug-
gested that although the provision precludes renewal by the pro-
prietor where a corporate assignee of an individual author first ob-
tained copyright, the provision might be read to allow renewal if the
corporate assignee were the assignee of an employer. 53 If renewal were
thus available on copyrights first obtained by an employer's assignee,
"some meaning for an otherwise meaningless provision might be
found."54
 Under this construction, renewals would be allowed under
the corporate-body provision on original copyrights obtained under
two widespread practices in the movie .ndustry: (a) where the em-
ployer of a scriptwriter assigns the employer's right to obtain
copyright to the corporation which will produce the motion picture; 55
42
 Donald Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocc& Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643cl
(2d Cir. 1967). As is pointed out in Epoch, 522 F. d at 747 a corporation's obtaining
copyright under these circumstances amounts to the securing of copyright as the
assignee of the author. See text at note 40 supra.
"123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 194I).
" Id. at 699. Works composed of distinguishable parts, for instance the text and
illustrations in a book, are renewable under the "composite works" provision of § 24.
Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1934) (by implication), era. denied, 294
U.S. 709 (1935).
52
 Bouve, Letter to the Librarian of Congress Concerning Certain Aspects of the
Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, (1938) at 43-44 quoted in B. RINGER, RENEWAL. OF
COPYRIGHT (General Revision of the Copyright Law Preliminary Study No. 24, 1960) at
23.
" 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 114.4 at 471 (1975).
54 Id.
55 The size of the industry involving the employment of scriptwriters is indicated
by the fact that in 1954 at least $25 million was paid to writers under employment con-
tracts with motion picture companies. W. BLAISDALE, SIZE OF THE. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES,
(General Revision of the Copyright Law, Preliminary Study B, 1960) at 12. In the same
year, the motion picture copyright industry generated a national income of $917 mil-
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and (b) where a company which produced a motion picture assigns its
right to obtain copyright to a corporate distributor." In both cases,
the corporate assignee obtains copyright by publishing the motion pic-
ture with notice of copyright, and under each practice the corporation
obtaining copyright is the assignee of the employer, not of the author.
In both cases, it is doubtful that renewals could be upheld under the
work-for-hire provision, since the works were not copyrighted by "an
employer for whom" the works were made." Therefore, in the absence
of Professor Nimmer's suggested interpretation of the corporate-body
provision, it appears that the corporate assignee in these two situa-
tions would be denied renewal of its copyright if ever challenged in
judicial proceedings.
Arguing as amicus curiae, Columbia Pictures Industries" at-
tempted to apply the analysis posited by Nimmer to the facts of Epoch
so as to bring the case within the ambit of the corporate-body.
provision." Columbia argued that because Epoch had obtained
copyright as the assignee of an employer (or a "purported" employer)
and not as the assignee of an individual author, the renewal should be
upheld under the corporate-body provision. 60 The court rejected this
argument, because Epoch had failed to prove that Griffith had
created the work as an employee of either of the assignor corpora-
tions, DWG and Majestic." Therefore, when DWG obtained statutory
copyright by publication with notice, it could have done so not as an
employer, but only as the assignee of the common law copyright held
by Griffith." "The clause cannot apply in these circumstances," the
court concluded. 63
This view of the transaction between Griffith and DWG flowed
from previous case law in the same circuit implying that where the
creative author is the dominant member of a corporation and the
corporation obtains original copyright, it secures copyright as the as-
lion. Id. at 30. All copyright industries generated a national income of $6.1 billion. Id. at
2.
" This practice is described in Rohauer v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933, 934 (9th Cir.
1962).
" 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (emphasis added). Most of the amicus curiae brief in
Epoch was devoted to the argument that the work-for-hire provision should not be
strictly construed. Columbia argued that copyright should be renewable under the
work-for-hire provision where the work was first copyrighted by the employer's assign-
ee, rather than the employer himself. See Brief for Columbia as Amicus Curiae at 6-32,
Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Brief fir Columbia as Amicus Curiae]. ,
55 The amicus curiae parties, Columbia Pictures Industries, Metro-Coldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth-Century-Fox Film Corp., United Art-
ists Corp., and Universal Pictures, were represented by M. Nimmer and G. Meyer.
59 See Brief for Columbia as Amicus Curiae, supra n.57, at 32-34.
" 0 Id. at 34.
" 522 F.2d at 746, 748.
" Id. at 748.
63
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signee of the author, not as his employer. 64 Thus, since the work had
been originally copyrighted by a corporate assignee of the individual
author, Epoch as the proprietor of the original copyright was not enti-
tled to renew under the corporate-body clause.
After rejecting Columbia Pictures' argument as inapplicable to
the facts presented, the court elucidated the circumstances under
which a copyright could be renewed under the corporate-body
provision.° Although the court did not explicitly reject the interpreta-
tion argued for by Columbia Pictures, the court's delineation of the
applicability of the provision would seem to preclude nearly all cir-
cumstances in which the proprietor could defend a renewal copyright
by asserting that a corporate assignee of the employer first copyright-
ed the work:
[W]hat authoritative commentary exists concerning the ...
provision ... indicates that it has no application to works of
this type which are authored and produced by one identifi-
able person either as an employee for hire or as an inde-
pendent author. For instance, Judge Learned Hand in dic-
tum interpreted the clause as applying only to works com-
posed by persons related to a corporation, but not as em-
ployees for hire, assignors or licensors.... The only other
interpretation of note would apply the clause only to works
of an impersonal nature composed by a staff or others
whose individual work is merged into the whole and incap-
able of separate identification."
The court's first sentence would appear to foreclose the applica-
tion of the provision where one identifiable employee produced the
work, even though the work may have been initially copyrighted by a
corporate assignee of the employer, for example, where the assignee
of a scriptwriter's employer obtains original copyright. The court's
statement that the provision has "no application to works of this type""
clearly imposes an additional requirement that the work not be pro-
duced by one identifiable employee. This additional requirement
would seem to foreshadow the failure of any argument that the
provision applies simply because the employer, rather than the au-
thor, assigned the right to obtain copyright.
The court's reference to Judge Hand's statement° 8 seems to pre-
clude reliance on the provision unless the work was composed by per-
sons related to the corporation which obtained original copyright.
This requirement would also appear to reject Columbia Pictures' ar-
ea Donaldson Publishing Corp. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639,
643 (2d Cir.), rert, denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1967) (by implication); 2 M. N1MMER, NiMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 114.3 at 469 (1975).
es
	 F.2d at 748.
" 6 Id.
67 /d. (emphasis added).
6" Id., citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1941).
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gument because the employee who composed the work for the assign-
or corporation would not, under Judge Hand's interpretation, be "re-
lated" to the assignee corporation. Thus the work would not have
been composed by persons related to the corporation that obtained
copyright.
The last sentence of the court's description of the applicability of
the provision would seem to complete the process of narrowly cir-
cumscribing its utility. The court referred to an interpretation limiting
the application of the clause to "works of an impersonal nature com-
posed by a staff or others whose individual work is merged ... and
incapable of separate identification."" It is difficult to imagine exam-
ples of such works other than the digests and dictionaries to which the
clause had previously been thought to apply." In sum, it seems clear
that the argument advanced by Columbia Pictures would have little
chance of success, even if it were squarely presented to the court,
given the court's narrow description of copyrights which are renew-
able under the corporate-body provision.
By so narrowly interpreting the provision, the court has so lim-
ited its applicability that it seems unlikely the provision will be utilized
to support renewals in future litigation. The result will be that pro-
prietors of renewal copyrights originally obtained by corporate issign-
ees of employers will be forced to rely on the work-for-hire provision
of section 24 when asserting the validity of their renewal copyrights
in infringement actions. In relying on this provision, such proprietors
will be confronted with additional difficulties.' It is nevertheless
submitted that the court was amply justified in its actions. Limiting
the applicability of the provision is consistent with both public policy
and the legislative history of the provision itself. The limitation serves
the public policy of strictly construing a statutory grant of
monopoly." Moreover, there is no indication in the legislative history
of the provision that it was intended to be construed expansively. On
"" 522 17.2d at 748. Composite works made up of identifiable parts are renewable
under the first proviso of § 24. See note 51 supra.
" B. RIMIER, RENEWAL or CoPvitnatT, (General Revision of the Copyright Law,
Preliminary Study No. 24, 1960) at 23.
" Asserting the validity of a renewal copyright under this provision may well
present both practical and legal difficulties. In addition to the problems involving proof
of entitlement of renewal, see text at notes 126-34 infra, the pre-copyright assignee
faces an issue which the court in Epoch did not resolve. Section 24 makes work-for-hire
copyrights renewable if the copyright was originally secured by "an employerfiir whom
such work is made for hire." 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (emphasis added). If this phrasing
means the employer himself must have obtained original copyright, renewals of
copyrights where the assignee obtained original copyright will not be valid. See note 57
supra.
" The policy which limits monopoly strictly to the terms of the statutory grant
should preclude any attempt to extend copyright monopoly, whatever "the particular
form or method by which the monopoly is sought to be extended ...." United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1942) (patents).
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the contrary, it was intended by Congress to limit the protection given
corporations."
To accept Columbia Pictures' expansive interpretation would
also be inconsistent with both the constitutional underpinning of the
Copyright Act and the policy of the Act itself. Granting automatic re-
newal rights where a corporate assignee first purchases an employer's
rights to copyright and thereafter copyrights the work would consti-
tute a direct grant of the renewal copyright to the corporation simply
because it is a corporation, not because it is an assignee of any re-
newal rights. This is so because such an employer has no renewal
rights to assign: the renewal, which is a separate grant, 74 is not avail-
able in this situation because the work was not copyrighted by the
employer. 75 Since the employer has no renewal rights to assign, a cor-
porate body in this situation is not claiming through succession to the
rights of the employer, but in its own right as a corporate proprietor
of the original copyright.
To grant renewal in such cases seems to violate the constitutional
foundation of the Copyright Act. A claim to copyright must be based
on authorship or succession to the author's rights. 76 Indeed, the Con-
stitution specifically authorizes Congress to secure the exclusive
"Right" only to authors. 77 Although by the enactment of section 26
Congress has included employers in the definition of "authors,"
neither the Constitution nor section 26 grants the right to claim
copyright to a party who does not claim through the author."
In addition, the policy of the Copyright Act to reward the crea-
tive efforts of individual authors would not be served by Columbia
Pictures' expansive interpretation. Employers are permitted to claim
directly the benefit of the full 56-year copyright monopoly because
they play a part in the creative process: they induce the author's crea-
tive efforts, 7° and they direct and supervise such efforts." "Sacrificial
days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate
73 See B. Ringer, supra note 70 at 22-24.
74 E.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
" 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). For the text of section 24, see note 26 supra.
" 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPvuiGHT §§ 60 at 233, 61 at 234, 61.2 at 235-37
(1975).
" The Constitution provides in Article 1 Section 8 that "the Congress shall have
Power ... [to secure] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries ...."
78 "[Me Constitution empowers Congress to create a copyright monopoly for
the benefit of authors, and in interpreting the Act every attempt should be made to
conform to the constitutional purpose for which this monopoly exists." Note, 44 COLUM.
L. REv. 712, 724 (1944).
78 Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 997 (1972).
8G Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1967); see also 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 114.4 n.62c at 470-70.1 (1975).
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with the services rendered."8 ' Since corporate assignees who purchase
the right to obtain copyright from employers after the creative pro-
cess is complete play no part in the creative process, they do not de-
serve the same reward.
Finally, to accept Columbia Pictures' interpretation would be to
favor corporations over individuals. As was pointed out by
under this interpretation, a corporation that secures initial-term
copyright as the assignee of an employer would automatically receive
renewal rights upon registration of the original copyright," but an
individual who secures copyright under the same circumstances would
not receive renewal rights." It is interesting to note that Professor
Nimmer, who had recognized this result in his treatise, 84 nevertheless
argued for the interpretation as counsel for Columbia Pictures. 85
Nothing in the history or interpretation of either the renewal clause
specifically, or of the Copyright Act generally, indicates that Congress
intended to favor corporations over individuals, In short, although
the court did not refer to these arguments based on legislative, con-
stitutional, and public policies, such policies fully justify the court's re-
jection of Columbia Pictures' attempted expansion of the corporate-
body provision.
II. THE SECTION 209 PRESUMPTION
Section 209 of the Copyright Act provides that a copyright cer-
tificate of registration is prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the
certificate. That section states:
In the case of each entry the person recorded as the claim-
ant of the copyright shall be entitled to a certificate of reg-
istration under seal of the copyright office.... Said certifi-
cate shall be admitted in any court as prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein."
Epoch sought to uphold the validity of its renewal copyright on the
ground that the renewal certificate itself was prima facie proof both
of the validity of the renewal copyright and also of the facts stated in
the certificate (that The Birth was a work for hire)."
It is well settled that under section 209 a certificate of original
copyright registration creates, at the least, a presumption that all of
the facts stated in the certificate are true. 88 Courts have also held that
" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
"2 See Brief for Appellants in Response to Brief of Amicus Curiae at 47-48,
Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
"3 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 114.4 at 470.3-471 (1975).
" Id.
"'See Brief for Columbia Pictures as Amiens Curiae, supra n.57, at 32-34.
"" 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1970).
" 522 F.2d at 746.
458 E.g., Jerry Vogel Music Co, v. Forster Music Publisher, 147 F.2d 614, 615 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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the certificate creates a presumption that the original copyright itself
is valid." However, the question of whether section 209 applies to
renewal certificates to create either of the above-stated presumptions
has been considered in only one other case. 9° The Epoch court ex-
pressly rejected the reasoning of that case and held that section 209
refers only to certificates of registration of the original copyright, not
to renewal certificates,"' In so holding, the court reasoned that the
evidentiary-weight provision of the section was meant to apply only to
original certificates, since the language of section 209 refers only to
the contents of the original certificate of registration.92
 The court's
reasoning is both accurate and sound.
The certificate of original registration recites facts referred to in
section 209 which are pertinent only to the original copyright, for ex-
ample, the name of the country of which the author is a citizen, the
domicile of the author, and information concerning deposit of
copies." 3 The certificate of renewal registration states facts that are not
referred to in section 209. That certificate sets forth the status under
which the proprietor has claimed copyright, the renewable matter, the
original registration number of the copyright, and the original
claimant. 94 Clearly, these are not the facts which section 209 states
shall be given prima facie evidentiary weight in judicial proceedings.
An examination of the purpose to be served by the original cer-
tificate of registration issued pursuant to section 209 strongly supports
this conclusion. The purpose of the certificate is to show that the
proprietor is entitled to the protection given statutory copyright —
the right to bring an action for infringement — because all the provi-
sions of the Copyright Act have been satisfied. 95 Section 11 provides
that the claimant may obtain a certificate pursuant to section 209
when the requirements of the Act, including deposit of copies, have
been satisfied. 96
 The copies demonstrate that statutory copyright has
" E.g., Stuff v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 342 F.2d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 1965). Profes-
sor Nimmer suggests that the latter conclusion is unwarranted because the certificate
does not show that certain notice requirements have continuously been met, a defect
which could have invalidated the copyright. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
139.2 at 603-04 (1975).
" Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 733-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). At
the time of the Epoch decision, Rohauer was still subject to review by the Second Circuit.
See 522 F.2d at 746, n.6. The Southern District of New York had earlier extended the
presumption to a renewal certificate. In Geese! v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court assumed without discussion that a presumption of validity
applies to a renewal certificate. Id. at 338, The validity of the renewal was not an issue
in the case. The district court in Rohauer v. Killiatn Shouts, Inc., supra, relied on this case,
among others, to reach its holding that § 209 refers to renewal certificates. Id. at 734.
" 522 F.2d at 746, n.6.
" 2 Id. at 745.
"a See Certificate: Registration of a Claim to Copyright in a Motion Picture, Form
L-M, lines 3(h), (c), 4 (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office: 1970-0-407-239).
" See Certificate of Registration of a Claim to Renewal Copyright, Form R, lines
I, 2(b), 4. (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office: 1970-0-409-555).
" 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11, 13 (1970). See note 3 supra.
" 17 U.S.C. § II (1970).
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been secured through publication with notice, pursuant to section
10. 97 Section 13 of the Act provides that an infringement action may
be brought only if (1) the work has been published with notice and (2)
copies have been deposited with the Copyright Office. 99 The section
209 certificate states that the claimant has published the work with
notice of copyright and has deposited copies of the work. 99 Thus the
certificate of registration demonstrates that the claimant has complied
with the statutory requirements for obtaining original copyright and
has demonstrated that compliance by depositing copies of the work
containing such notice.
However, the facts given prima facie evidentiary weight by sec-
tion 209 are not the facts which show the requirements for obtaining
a renewal copyright have been satisfied. Those requirements relate to
the type of work upon which the original copyright is held and are set
forth in section 24. 10° Certainly the prima facie weight which the cer-
tificate affords to the satisfaction of requirements for registering an
original copyright pursuant. to sections 10, 11, and 13 should not es-
tablish that the proprietor who has obtained a renewal certificate has
met the requirements of section 24 and may bring an action for in-
fringement.
The court reinforced its view that the section 209 presumption
of validity does not apply to renewals by noting that the Copyright
Office registers conflicting claims to the same renewal copyright.'m
To give prima facie evidentiary weight to certificates issued under
such circumstances would seem contradictory since the presumption
would be meaningless in a case where each of the adverse parties pre-
sented such a certificate.'"
The court also supported its holding that the section 209 pre-
sumption does not apply to renewal certificates by referring to dis-
parities in the verification of original and renewal claims and to con-
gressional intent.'" It is submitted, however, that the factual assump-
tions upon which the first rationale is based are inaccurate and that
the reasoning based on congressional intent is strained.
The court referred to Copyright Office regulations"' to demon-
strate that the Copyright Office requires at least "minimal verifica-
" 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
"" 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1970),
" 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1970).
"" 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). See note 26 supra.
'"' 522 F.2d at 745. The practice of registering conflicting claims to the same
copyright is based on Opinions of the Attorney General stating the Register of
Copyrights has no duty to deny claims that may be illegal. Ironically, the Copyright Of-
fice sought an opinion of the Attorney General because it assumed renewal certificates
were deemed prima facie evidence of the finis stated therein. See Op. Att'y. Gen. 183
U.S,P,Q. 624, 625-26 (1974). The opinion ()I' the Attorney General also assumed the §
209 presumption applied to renewal certificates. H. at 628.
1112 See note 24 supra.
522 F.2d at 745-46.
101 37 C.F.R. 202.3(b)(3) (1975).
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Lion" of facts for an original registration, but requires no verification
fora renewal copyright. "The Copyright Office directs in its regula-
tions that the application for original registration accurately reflect
`the facts existing at the time of first publication.' ... No such admo-
nition is applied to applications for renewal copyright." 105
 This dif-
ference in the verification of facts between original and renewal
copyright applications was deemed to justify different treatment of
the section 209 presumption in renewal cases." 6
The court's finding of a difference in verification between origi-
nal and renewal applications, however, is subject to question. As par-
tially quoted by the court, the regulation appears to be an admonition
to applicants to be accurate in their statements. However, a reading of
the entire regulation reveals that its purpose is rather to direct appli-
cants to provide information pertinent to the first publication of the
work, rather than information concerning later developments. The
entire regulation provides:
Applications for copyright registration covering published
works should reflect the facts existing at the time of first pub-
lication, and should not include information concerning changes
that have occurred between the time of publication and
registration. The name given as copyright claimant in the
application should agree with the name appearing in the
copyright notice.'"
To find on the basis of this regulation that claimants to original
certificates are required to state facts accurately but claimants to re-
newals are not would seem to lead to the undesirable and inaccurate
conclusion that applicants for renewal are free to misrepresent facts
when they apply for registration. In fact, applications for both
original-term and renewal certificates are not accepted by the
Copyright Office unless the claimant has certified that the statements
made on the application are correct to the best of his knowledge. The
application for registration of a claim to copyright in a motion picture
requires the claimant or his agent to sign the following statement: "I
CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are cor-
rect to the best of my knowledge." 108 The application for renewal re-
quires precisely the same statement. 1 U 9 Both applications state that the
"' 522 F.2d at 745.
"" Id.
"7 37 C.F.R. 202.3(b)(3) (1975) (emphasis added). Had this regulation been in
effect when Epoch and Dixon applied for registration of the original copyright in 1915,
the inconsistency of their claim to be the original claimant of copyright, where the pub-
lished work bore notice of copyright in the name of DWG Corp., would have been
readily apparent. See note 5 supra.
1 " Application for Registration of a Claim to Copyright, Form L-M, line 10 (U.S.
Gov't. Printing Office: 1970-0-407-239) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as Ap-
plication for Copyright].
10 ' Application for Registration of a Claim to Renewal Copyright, Form R, line 8
(U.S. Gov't. Printing Office: 1970-0-409.555) [hereinafter cited as Application for
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application is not acceptable unless the certification is signed."°
In addition, both the original-term and renewal applications re-
quire the same facts concerning the original copyright. The applicant
for renewal is informed that these facts must agree with those of the
Copyright Office records,"' and the Copyright Office verifies the
facts asserted in the renewal application by comparing them to the
facts of the original registration." 2 Therefore, contrary to the court's
conclusion, it appears that there is no difference in the verification of
facts between original and renewal applications: in both cases the ap-
plicant must verify that the facts stated on the application are true.
Assuming arguendo that the court was correct in all of its state-
ments concerning differences between applications for original and
renewal certificates, such differences would not appear to support the
conclusion arrived at by the court concerning the congressional intent
behind section 209. The court concluded its interpretation of section
209 by noting that the Copyright Office's disparate treatment of orig-
inal and renewal applications — the differences in verification and the
issuance of conflicting renewal certificates — leads to the conclusion
that "Congress surely did not intend" that the weight of the section
209 presumption attach to renewal certificates." 3 This reasoning
seems to combine a questionable reading of the Copyright Office reg-
ulations with an equally questionable leap in logic: the court in effect
assumed that Congress knew in 1909, when it approved section 209,
what the Copyright Office regulation would provide when promul-
gated in 1956." 4
A more appropriate method for discerning whether Congress in-
tended renewal certificates to carry evidentiary weight under section
209 would have been to examine the policy underlying the Copyright
Act and the general public policy against the extension of a statutory
monopoly, which is reflected by the renewal provision. The policy of
Renewal]. The Copyright Office does not attempt to determine the truth or falsity of
statements of fact in either the original or the renewal application. C. BERGER,
AUTHORITY OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS TO REJECT APPLICANTS FOR REGISTRATION
85, 94 (Copyright Law Revision Study No. 18, 1959), in COPYRIGHT Socy. OF U.S.A., i
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT' 393, 403-04 (1963) (original application): R. RINGER, RENEWAL OF
CopyRIGHT 167, 183-84 (General Revision of the Copyright Law, Study No. 31, 1960) in
COPYRIGHT SOC'y OF U.S.A., 1 STuDiEs ON COPYRIGHT 503, 570-80 (1963) (renewals). An
interesting discussion of the contrast between the verification procedures of the Patent
Office and those of the Copyright Office may be found in Goldberg & Dannay, Fraud
on the Copyright Office: Its Use and Misuse as a Defense in Copyright Infringement Actions, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 540 (1969).
"" Application Ow Copyright, supra note 108, line 10; Application fin. Renewal,
supra note 109, line 8.
'" See Application for Copyright, supra note 108, lines 1, 5, 6; Application for
Renewal, supra note 109, line 4.
"2 B. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT 107, 183-84 (General Revision of the
Copyright Law, Study No. 31, 1960), in CopyREGHT Soul' or U.S.A., 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT' 503, 570-80 (1063).
"' 522 F.2d at 746.
'" 21 Fed. Reg. 6023 (1956).
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the Copyright Act is to benefit the public by encouraging individual
creative efforts. 15
 This encouragement is provided by the financial
incentive of a statutorily created monopoly in the copyrighted
work. 16
 Such a monopoly, however, concentrates the dissemination of
ideas in a few hands and is counter to the public interest in free ac-
cess to ideas and creative works." 7
 Congress reconciled these conflict-
ing interests by providing that the monopoly be limited in time."' By
thus limiting the monopoly, Congress effectuated the basic purpose of
the Act by balancing the competing interests of the author and the
public.
This balancing of interests is reflected in section 24, the renewal
provision. That provision takes special steps to protect the individual
author,'" and, in cases where the protection of the author is not ef-
fected by renewal of the copyright, ensures that the work passes into
the public domain. Section 24 protects the author by providing for a
reversion of the right to obtain copyright renewals.' 20 As noted
above,"' there are three exceptions to this general rule. However, in
all cases except those involving the three exceptions, only the indi-
vidual author, certain members of his family, or his executor may
renew.' 22
The proprietors who may renew under the three exceptions are
less favored than the individual author. For example, if the employer
obtains original copyright, he and his family do not receive the pro-
tection of a reversion of renewal rights; that is, if the employer has as-
signed the original-term copyright, the assignee rather than the em-
ployer becomes the proprietor who may renew under the work-for-
hire provision.'" Corporate assignees of the author who obtain origi-
nal copyright are even less favored than employers, for they not only
"s Fox Film Corp. v. Royal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932).
" 8
 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
"2 Warren, Foreword to B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT at vii,
viii-ix (1967).
" 8 1d.; I M. NIMMER, N ON COPYRIGHT § 5.4 at 10.1 (1975).
" 2 See note 25 supra & cases cited therein.
120 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
181 Id.
"2
 This conclusion assumes, of course, that the individual author has not specifi-
cally assigned his renewal interest. However, even if the individual author has assigned
his renewal rights, the renewal must still be obtained in his name. White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 249 (1st Cir. 1911); 28 OP. Arry GEN. 162, 169
(1910). The individual author then holds the renewal in trust for his assignee. 28 OP.
Arm' GEN. 169 (1910). Thus if the author dies before the period during which the re-
newal may be obtained, the right to renew reverts to the statutory beneficiaries. M.
Witmark & Sons v. Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 999, 950 (2d Cir. 1942), affg 38 F.
Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); 2 M. N1MMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 117.3 at 503 (1975).
An example of an assignee's taking careful steps to protect his renewal interest may be
seen in Selwyn Co. v. Veiller, 43 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), where the renewal pro-
prietor had purchased the renewal rights from the author's assignee, then purchased
any existing rights from the author, his wife and his son. Id. at 492.
13 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1941) (re-
jecting the applicability of 26 to 24).
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do not acquire renewal rights when they obtain original copyright,'"
but they also are specifically barred from renewing by the corporate-
body provision.' 25 By thus limiting the copyrights which may be re-
newed by parties other than the author, the renewal provision serves
the public interest in three ways: (1) the public interest in encouraging
creativity is effected by mandating the reversion of rights to the au-
thor; (2) the public interest in free access to creative works is fur-
thered by passing the work into the public domain in most cases
where the author does not renew; and (3) the public policy against
unwarranted extensions of the statutorily created monopoly is served
by the narrowness of the exceptions whereby non-authors may renew
copyright.
These policy considerations and the intent of Congress to give
the benefit of the renewal monopoly to individual authors over all
others dictate that those persons other than authors who seek to in-
voke the protection of the Copyright Act for a copyright renewal be
prepared to demonstrate that they were in fact entitled to receive the
renewal monopoly. 126 The Epoch court's holding that such renewal
proprietors may not utilize a renewal certificate to establish that theirs
was a status entitling them to renew achieves this result.'" The court's
decision will require the renewal proprietor who is not the individual
author clearly to establish by means other than the renewal certificate
that, at the time of renewal, his status was one entitling him to
renew. 128 Thus, such a proprietor will be required to show not only
that he held title to the initial-term copyright, 12 " but also that he was
'" Austin v, Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
'" Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639,
643 (2d Cir, 1967), ten, denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968).
'" It was suggested in the early period , of renewal litigation that renewal recip-
ients clearly establish their status at the time they apply so as to avoid confusion as to
whose position the renewal purchaser had assumed.
To avoid any doubt as to whose position the purchaser undertakes to
stand in, the renewal should be in the name of the person entitled under
the statute.... In any subsequent action involving the copyright, the recip-
ient of the renewal has the burden of showing who was properly entitled
under the statutory schedule, the absence of any prior statutory designees,
and the capacity of the person under whom the purchaser •claims. The
groundwork should he laid at the administrative stage.
Note, 44 COMM!. L. REV. 712, 731 (1944). See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 47 F. Stipp. 490, 492 (1942), modified on other grounds, 140 F.2d 268
(1944),
127 522 F.2d at 745-46.
r' The court's holding imposes no new burden on the individual author. His
right to obtain renewal is based on his authorship or the work, He is designated as the
author on the original certificate of registration, even if he assigned the right to obtain
copyright. The original certificate is still prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the
certificate. Thus the court's holding that the renewal certificate may not be used to es-
tablish the validity of a renewal does not burden the individual author, who may estab-
lish the status entitling bins to renew simply by means of the original certificate.
1 " Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 113 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1940); 2
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYREGI-IT § 141.1 at 611-13 (1975).
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in fact entitled to renew because the work was originally either a work
for hire, 13° copyrighted by a corporation that was not an assignee or
licensee of the individual author,' 3 ' or a composite or posthumous
work copyrighted by the proprietor.' 32
If the increased burden of clearly demonstrating the proprietor's
status to renew cannot be met by evidence other than the renewal cer-
tificate, a greater number of artistic creations will, a fortiori, pass into
the public domain.' 33
 This result is consistent with the policy of the
renewal provision that the public should have free access to the work
after those entitled to benefit from the monopoly have been rewarded
for their efforts.
It is upon this basis, which reflects congressional intent at the
time the Copyright Act was enacted, and not upon the basis of subse-
quently promulgated Copyright Office regulations, that the Epoch
court should have ascertained a congressional intent not to afford
prima facie evidentiary weight to the contents of the renewal certifi-
cate. This congressional intent, together with not only the different
purposes and contents of original and renewal certificates, but also
the possibility of two adverse parties presenting renewal certificates in
the same case, clearly supports the court's conclusion that a renewal
certificate is not entitled to prima facie evidentiary weight under sec-
tion 209.
CONCLUSION
In ruling that a renewal certificate of copyright does not carry
evidentiary weight, the Epoch court has imposed several perhaps un-
foreseen requirements on the renewal proprietor who brings an in-
fringement action in the Second Circuit. The proprietor must show by
proof other than his renewal certificate that at the time of renewal, he
was the proprietor of one of the types of copyright designated as re-
newable in section 24. If he asserts that the copyright was renewable
under the work-for-hire provision, he will be required to show that
"° The initial-term registration certificate does not show a work was a "work for
hire." Thus the proprietor litigating a renewal faces the burden of showing that the
work was created "for hire" more than twenty-eight years before.
"I
 For the reasons discussed in the text of this note at notes 65-70, it is doubtful
that proprietors will assert this provision to establish the validity of a renewal.
"2 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 114.2 at 468 (1975). It may be antici-
pated that the proprietor's status to renew under this provision of § 24 could be shown
simply by producing the initial-term registration certificate, which would be prima facie
evidence of the proprietor's status to renew and of the fact that the work was posthum-
ous, periodical, cyclopedic, or composite.
"3
 It should be noted that at the time of the court's decision, The Birth had been
under the monopoly of copyright for sixty years. Epoch had held the renewal copyright
for thirty-two years. Although the Copyright Act provides only twenty-eight years for
the original copyright and twenty-eight years for the renewal, Congress has enacted
special legislation periodically for the last thirteen years extending renewal copyrights.
522 F.2d at 741 n.3; e.g., Act of Dec. 19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 104, 88 Stat.
1873.
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the work was originally created as a work for hire and that the puta-
tive employer "could have exercised the requisite power to control or
supervise" the author-employee. 134 If a renewal proprietor asserts that
the copyright was renewable under the corporate-body provision, he
faces three tasks. He must-establish that the work was not authored by
one identifiable person. He must show that the persons who com-
posed the work were related to the corporation which obtained origi-
nal copyright, but related in some way other than as employees or
assignors. Furthermore, he must show that their contributions to the
work are merged and "incapable of separate identification." These re-
quirements would seem to foreclose the utilization of the corporate-
body provision as a basis for upholding a renewal for all but an ex-
tremely limited type of work.
ANNE ELIZABETH ROGERS
Securities Law--insider Liability Under Section 16(b) of The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934Whiting v. Dow Chemical
Co.' —In September and October of 1973, Helen Dow Whiting sold
29,770 shares of Dow Chemical Company (Dow), which she had ac-
quired by gift and inheritance.' In December of 1973, her husband
Macauley Whiting, a director of Dow, exercised his executive stock
option and purchased 21,420 shares of Dow. 3 To finance his pur-
chase, Mr. Whiting borrowed some of the funds which Mrs. Whiting
had received from her earlier sales.' The sales and purchase were
made pursuant to a joint long-term investment plan which the Whit-
ings had devised with their financial adviser.' Although the Whitings
maintained separate investment accounts,' they filed a joint income
tax return and combined their -individual funds to meet the family's
living expenses.' Mr. Whiting contributed nearly his entire salary to-
wards those expenses.' Mrs. Whiting contributed an even larger sum,
primarily derived from dividends and capital gains on her Dow
holdings."
When Dow informed Mr. Whiting of its intention to recover the
profits realized as a result of matching Mrs. Whiting's sales with Mr.
' 84 522 F.2d at 744.
523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
2 Id. at 682. At the time of her sales, Mrs. Whiting owned less than 10% of the
outstanding shares of Dow common. Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp.
1130,1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3 523 F.2d at 682.
4 Id.
Id. at 684.
"Id. at 683.
Id. at 682.
8 Id.
Id,
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